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In much of the recent literature on the subject, autonomy is interpreted as having the capacity 
and freedom to be the primary judge and executor of how one’s life goes (see e.g. Dworkin 
1998; Dworkin 1994; Beauchamp and Childress 2008; Korsgaard 2009; Radoilska 2013). In 
the case of the normal and competent human adult - sometimes identified with the 
enfranchised citizen of a modern democratic state - our capacity for self-governance can be 
thought of as grounding a constraint on what other people (including the state and its 
representatives) can legitimately do to us, thereby providing a rationale for consent 
requirements of various sorts (see e.g. Estlund 2007). On this view, the failure to elicit my 
consent in the context of some specific interaction is to fail to respect me as the autonomous, 
and thereby normatively qualified, agent I am. One obvious limitation of this explanation is 
that the practice of constraining behaviour by eliciting consent extends far beyond the domain 
of agents who satisfy the standard requirements of autonomous, self governing, rational 
agency (see e.g. McMahan 1996; Beauchamp 2005; Kittay 2005; Levy 2006; Nussbaum 
2009; Lillehammer 2012). Cases in this category include persons with mental health 
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questions; to Bjørn Hoffman for responding to a draft version; and to Edmund Henden for the 
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difficulties involving self-destructive behaviour (such as substance addiction) or denial (such 
as anorexia); limited and diminishing capacity or competence (such as dementia)2; and a 
large variety of less diagnostically circumscribed behaviours, such as temporal myopia; 
inconstancy of preference; indecisiveness; ill temper; extensive confusion, anxiety, or severe 
depression. What explains the constraints on our (here presumed to be beneficent) behaviour 
towards such persons, and on what grounds could we be said to owe them a duty to elicit 
consent? 
 
2. Consent in context 
 
Three preliminary points by way of clarification. First, in what follows I will not do justice to 
a number of the most contested aspects of the ethics of consent. For example, I will have little 
to say about the distinction between actual and hypothetical consent. I will generally assume 
that the consent we are interested in is actual, not merely hypothetical or imagined. Thus, if 
my students were to raid my bookshelf while I am away at a conference the fact that I might 
have agreed to lend them the books had they asked me to does not legitimate the raid. In 
making this assumption, I do not mean to imply that hypothetical consent never has 
justificatory force. On the contrary, I think it does (e.g. in some cases of forgetfulness or 
distraction.) Moreover, I will have little to say about the distinction between acts of consent 
																																								 																				
2 “Capacity”, or “competence”, is a legally recognised status in many jurisdictions, and in the 
UK is widely understood as follows: an agent is considered be have capacity/be competent 
with respect to a decision if she i) can understand ‘the information’ relevant to making that 
decision; ii) can retain that information to make a decision; iii) can weigh up that information 
to make a decision; and iv) can communicate their decision based on weighing that 
information (See e.g. Alzheimer’s Society (GB), 2018). Why we should respect mere 
capacity or competence, so understood, is one of the questions addressed in this paper, 
although the domain of cases at issue can also be extended beyond the domain of capacity or 
competence as defined above (and in comparable documents).  
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and consent that is otherwise inferred by the fact that someone “goes along” with something, 
and is thereby regarded as having “tacitly” or “implicitly” consented to what could then be 
described as a “consensual act”. I will generally assume that the consent at issue involves 
some kind of act (whether linguistically articulated or otherwise). Thus, if my students were 
to raid my bookshelf while I am busy putting out a fire elsewhere in the building, the fact that 
for the moment I let them get on with it does not legitimate the raid either. In making this 
assumption, I do not mean to imply that interpersonal interactions without prior acts of 
consent are thereby illegitimate. On the contrary, I think the insistence that only acts of 
consent can legitimate intervention is frequently misguided (e.g. in cases where a gentle 
nudge will do); sometimes perverse (e.g. in cases where it would undermine fragile trust); 
and sometimes incoherent (e.g. if a client insists that every possible eventuality must be 
explicitly covered in a contract). Nor will I have anything to say about the fact that some 
legitimate consent is given by a “surrogate” (as when I authorise a professional to represent 
me as my “agent”, or when adults are placed in the position of making choices about the 
medical treatment of infants). Finally, I will have little to say about the fact that consent is 
referentially opaque. I will mostly assume that the parties in question could in principle agree 
about at least some of the basic and ethically relevant aspects of the question at issue 
(although there will be cases involving incapacity where this is not the case). Thus, if I 
consent to one of my students relieving me of “some” of my books, the fact that “some” is 
consistent with “all” in First Order Predicate Logic does not legitimate her making off with 
the lot. In making this assumption, I do not mean to imply that interpreting someone’s 
consent as extending further than the range of descriptions they have consciously entertained 
is always illegitimate. On the contrary, any reasonable norms for informed consent will 
embody a set of shared expectations about how such cases are to be interpreted, and not only 
so as to accommodate the semantic explosives of the philosophical logician (e.g. by factoring 
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in time-constraints, unforeseen events, or institutional protocol). Finally, I will mainly treat 
“absence of consent” as neutral between consent not being elicited and consent being elicited 
but refused. Thus, the students may decide to raid my books without asking me, or in spite of 
my insistence that they are not for them to borrow. This is not to say that there is no ethical 
difference between the two cases. Clearly there is (e.g. depending on whether I am readily 
available to be asked), but this is not a difference that will make the difference in the cases in 
which I am primarily interested here. 
 
Second, what I say in what follows is premised on the understanding that the vast majority of 
interactions where we think that consent is ethically called for do not take place in the context 
of complex institutions such as universities or hospitals. On the contrary, most of these 
transactions take place in more informal settings, as when someone takes me along to the 
forest in order to teach me how to ski; then undertakes to bandage my subsequently sprained 
ankle; then eventually offers me a ride home. Much of the systematic thinking that has been 
produced in recent decades about the ethics of consent has focused on the need to articulate 
reasonable and enforceable guidelines for application in specific institutions (such as 
hospitals) in response to particular events (such as cases of mistreatment) located in particular 
contexts of intervention (such as the removal and use of human tissue, or a rising culture of 
litigation). All this systematic thinking serves a specific set of societal needs to establish 
mutually recognised and reasonably precise “criteria”, such as legal standards or codes of 
good practice. At the same time, when articulating a systematic rationale for these practices, 
it is reasonable to appeal to values and aspirations that have a history outside of these 
particular contexts. These facts together produce the following tension. On the one hand, the 
systematic theoretical rationale (e.g. respect for autonomy) provided for a given practice (e.g. 
informed consent requirements) may come to look excessively abstract or “idealistic” to the 
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people (e.g. mental health professionals) who are faced with the task of applying it in the 
context of day-to-day care for individual patients; each and every one of whom is always 
going to be truly “unique” in some particular way. On the other hand, the implementation of 
this rationale by those who are tasked with doing so can come across as narrow-minded, 
bureaucratic, “commodifying” or self-serving to other interested parties (such as patient 
representatives, or university academics who analyse the institutional administrative 
apparatus at work). In order to resolve this tension, both sides may have to give. The 
structural incentives and constraints that drive discussions of consent requirements in the 
context of specific institutions ultimately gain their legitimacy from values that are not only 
present in society more widely, but that will frequently pre-date and survive those 
institutions. Hence, we are entitled to think about the value of consent, for example, outside 
these institutional contexts in order to inform our views about how to respect it within them. 
At the same time, our commitment to the value in question derives its legitimacy at least in 
part from our ability to realise it within the institutional contexts where it actually needs to be 
applied “in real time”. Hence, we are entitled to complain when systematic theoretical 
justifications of a given practice (such as informed consent requirements) fail to speak to the 
decisions that institutions, clients, patients and their representatives actually face. We need to 
recognize that there is nothing intrinsically wrong about the fact that people in paid 
employment should want to cover themselves against complaints or litigation by asking 
service users to certify that they actually agree to central aspects of what is going to happen 
to them. In the absence of such safeguards, not only would much professional work involving 
substantial risk of harm to others be prudentially reckless. By effectively absorbing the 
decision-making role of all the patients in their care, the moral burdens imposed on carers 
would be potentially overwhelming.3 
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Third, it is possible to value consent without thinking of it as either overriding, or some kind 
of master value. This is not only because there are other things (such as health outcomes or 
efficiency) that we could value more. It is also because prioritising consent can actually end 
up undermining the values we want it to serve (c.f. Groll 2012). There are at least four 
reasons for this. First, eliciting consent can actually be a manipulative form of behaviour. 
Thus, an unusually generous person who is highly anxious about saying “No” to requests can 
be dominated by others who pick up on this fact and use it opportunistically to gain 
advantage.4 Second, refusing to give consent can equally be a manipulative form of 
behaviour. Thus, a person who seeks to dominate another can manipulate them by repeatedly 
refusing to consent to things they either have nothing against or, in the extreme case, actually 
want and are hoping to achieve.5 Third, giving consent can itself be a manipulative form of 
behaviour. Thus, a person who is willing to do an unusually large number of favours in order 
to thereby gain status, power or protection may cultivate their disposition to give consent as 
part of a long-term strategy of making the people around them feel indebted, dependent on 
their good will, or subject to their control.6 Fourth, some practices of eliciting and giving 
consent are superficial, meaningless, or even oppressive. As anyone knows who has even 
minimal experience of working in a complex modern institution (such as a university or a 
public health service), or who has ever done so much as to purchase an item online (such as a 
standard plane ticket), some legally enforceable practices of eliciting consent arguably have 
much less to do with respecting the autonomy of anyone involved than “going through the 
																																								 																				
4 This point should be familiar to anyone who has ever been a victim of aggressive sales 
tactics.  
5 There are notorious issues I pass over here about the distinction between cases where “ 
“No” means No”, and cases where someone is “playing hard to get”, or simply playing.  
6 There are complex issues here I pass over about how “generosity” can function as a form of 
entrapment. One obvious, if imperfect, analogy is between being very cooperative on the one 
hand, and offering gifts or bribes on the other. 
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motions” in a highly asymmetric relationship that leaves very little room for the pursuit of 
acceptable alternatives.7 Thus, it is a well-worn criticism of capitalist liberal democracies that 
while giving people the “illusion” of multiple freedoms, they are simultaneously in the 
business of perpetuating a battery of “legitimation myths” for practices that are said to 
remove from the vast majority of the individuals affected many forms of meaningful choice 
(see e.g. Zizek 2014). Be that as it may, the people who make such criticisms are not 
seriously suggesting that the case for consent requirements is, at all times and in all places 
(such as in your average transaction with a hospital nurse), conditional on this aim. Yet 
awareness of situations in which consent requirements actually undermine the values they are 
meant to promote is an indispensable constraint on any plausible account of its ethical 
significance, whether in theory or in practice. 
 
3. Consent in the “non-ideal” case 
 
In some cases where consent is sought it is not only true that the person asked for consent 
fails to exhibit the standard marks of autonomous, or self-governing, rational agency. It is 
also true that the person in question, when faced with a decision, is likely to fail to choose 
what is in their best interest; will forget or regret that they have made the decision in 
question; will hold it against the person or persons eliciting consent that things have turned 
out as they have as a result of that decision; or will not fully understand the significance of 
their consent or what they have consented to. Let’s call a case that meets these conditions a 
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“non-ideal case”.8 Why be concerned to elicit the consent of such a far from fully 
autonomous agent, whose choices you know are likely to be an unreliable, or poor, guide to 
what is in their own best interest? What, if anything could be the legitimate source of 
complaint if you disregard the question of someone’s consent in such a “non-ideal” case?  
 
There is a range of familiar answers to this question; none of which will cover all possible 
cases, but each of which will cover some (c.f. Scoccia 1990; Groll 2012; Lillehammer 2012). 
A first range of answers is unlikely to speak directly to the main problem addressed in this 
paper, but is nevertheless worth noting for the record. First, in failing to get my consent you 
may cause me displeasure or frustration, or even make me hard or impossible to deal with; 
and hence to this extent be acting against my (or even your own) best interest. By getting my 
consent you could simply be making sure that we are able to get along. Second, in failing to 
get my consent you may be acting against a general expectation in our group (or in society as 
a whole); thereby causing displeasure or frustration; hence potentially making both me and 
others even harder to deal with in the future; hence be acting against a general, or shared 
interest. Third, in failing to get my consent you may express a lack of respect for people like 
me; thereby showing yourself in a bad light; hence displaying a personal character defect or 
vice – regardless of whether you are acting in my best interest or not. Fourth, in failing to get 
my consent you may fail to show due respect for the person I once was (e.g. if I am suffering 
from some degenerative disorder) or the person I could have been (e.g. if I am suffering from 
a permanent disability). Fifth, in failing to get my consent you may fail to show respect for 
the fact that I am a member of some ethically salient category, where that category is not 
defined specifically in terms of a capacity for autonomous agency. Thus, I could respond to 
																																								 																				
8	As previously noted, this will include a range of cases in which patients are deemed to have 
“capacity” or “competence”. 
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your failure to get my consent that you are refusing to treat me as a family member, a fellow 
national, or a fellow human being (c.f. Williams 2006).9 All of this is true, but fails to speak 
fully to the idea that there is something missing in failing to elicit consent in particular that is 
explicable in terms of the specific individual I actually am, here and now, in at least some of 
the “non-ideal” cases at issue in this paper. 
 
A second set of answers is able to capture at least some of these “non-ideal” cases head-on, 
but is unable to capture other cases of the kind. First, failure to elicit consent could be a 
missed opportunity to help me acquire or enhance a capacity to exercise fully autonomous, or 
self-governing, rational agency. Its wrongness could therefore be analogous to the wrongness 
of refusing someone therapy or treatment, or failing to provide education to a person with 
special needs (c.f. Pickard 2013). This could explain consent requirements in cases where 
either improvement or recovery is possible, and also in a wide range of cases beyond that, at 
least insofar as we factor in the uncertainty of outcomes. It does not, however, explain 
consent requirements in cases where the probability of improvement or recovery approaches 
zero (such as in cases of advancing dementia). Second, a failure to elicit consent could be a 
missed opportunity to stop, or slow down, a process of losing the capacity for fully 
autonomous, or self-governing, rational agency. Its wrongness could therefore be analogous 
to the wrongness of refusing someone preventive or controlling treatment or medication. This 
																																								 																				
9	Another alternative is to explicate the respect I am owed in terms of the fact (if it is a fact) 
that I am a person. Unfortunately, the moral category of “personhood” is so contested with 
respect to the question of whether, and to what extent, moral personhood requires the 
capacity for autonomous agency that it is likely to be of limited use in the present context. 
Here is Harry Frankfurt: “To be a person, as distinct from simply a human organism, requires 
a complex volitional structure involving reflective self-evaluation. Human beings that lack 
this structure may be free of inherent volitional conflict, but they are not persons.” (Frankfurt 
1999, 103) It might be asked if the domain of agents at issue in this paper is actually 
exhausted by the category of persons, however that notion is best understood. I do not 
propose to answer this question here. I am grateful to Neil Manson for raising the issue in 
discussion. 
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could explain consent requirements in cases where, even if improvement or recovery is not a 
possibility, there is some likelihood of a person being able to live and cope with their 
condition as long as possible, or longer than they otherwise would. It does not, however, 
explain consent requirements where the probability of slowing down the process of 
deterioration approaches zero (such as in cases of permanent incapacity). Third, you might 
ask for my consent on the fictional assumption, or pretence, that I actually have these 
capacities. Perhaps there are cases of therapy, treatment or education as just described that 
approximate to this case (As in “Let’s pretend to be adults”). Partly for that reason, and partly 
because I am looking for ways to capture consent requirements that don’t crucially depend on 
insincerity, delusion or make-believe, I will not discuss this possibility further. This is not to 
deny that it can sometimes be justified to approach a particular case in a way that abstracts to 
some degree from the established facts and probabilities in play. On the contrary, fictions, 
pretence and make-believe arguably play a more important role in the psychosocial dynamics 
of such cases than standard philosophical treatments have traditionally been prone to give 
them.10 
 
So what could possibly be the point of giving someone a choice to consent in conditions 
where there is no expectation that they will successfully exercise fully autonomous, or self-
governing, rational agency in the consideration, making, or execution of that choice? 
Consider some parallel cases. First, it is often appropriate to ask someone for their opinion 
even when the final decision will actually be made by someone else. Being invited to give an 
opinion (i.e. being consulted) is obviously not the same as being given the opportunity to 
refuse, yet some invitations to refuse actually function more like invitations to have an 
																																								 																				
10	 In much the same way, such treatments have normally tended of stay well clear of the 
interpretation of the symbols, myths and rituals that inform the practice of common forms of 
health care. 
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opinion even if they are couched in the language of consent (as in “Do you mind if I… pour 
you a glass of water; push ahead; make your bed; schedule the exam…”). Hence, just as there 
are offers that are meant to be refused (as in: “Would you like me to… take the class for you; 
make your clothes; never contact you again…”), there are offers to refuse that are meant to be 
refused (As in “If you really don’t want to...”). Indeed, the class of offers to refuse that are 
meant to be refused include both cases where the refusal to give consent is expected to lead to 
inaction (as in: “No, not now. I’m too busy”) and where it is expected to escalate the situation 
or take it to another level (as in “OK, I will be back later”; or “Well, I’m sorry; but we will 
need to… give you food; receive your essay by the deadline; make sure that all your debts are 
paid”). Furthermore, there are offers to refuse that are not meant to be refused as such but the 
failure to refuse of which can function to slow down or otherwise restructure the project of 
realising a specified outcome the ultimate shape of which is not assumed to be fully within 
the control of the party being asked for consent. (Some complex medical procedures may fall 
into this category.) Indeed, the fact that the outcome of the transaction is in some sense pre-
determined, or implicitly assumed, does not remove the rationale of asking for consent. We 
can see the rational acceptance of this fact in a wide range of practices that, if considered 
purely in the abstract, may seem curious or even bizarre but, when reflecting on their social 
significance, are far from obviously crazy. To take just one topical example of the kind from 
the political arena: some institutional checks and balances function in an analogous way, even 
in the face of (or, perhaps precisely because of) significant asymmetries in power and 
understanding between the balancing parties. Thus, the parliament of a constitutional 
monarchy may be legally obliged to subject its major legislative decisions to royal, or some 
kind of other constitutional, approval (such as a referendum). As we all know, this does not 
always mean that the consenting “agent” in question is seriously expected to refuse, or that if 
he or she is reluctant to agree the proposals will not be carried out in some form anyway; 
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either immediately, after some delay, or after further discussion or amendment (e.g. where a 
referendum is treated as consultative). Nor is it always the case that the “agent” being asked 
to consent is either fully on top of what the decision involves; has the capacity to work it out 
for him or herself; has the power or ability to execute the decision; or will not come to regret 
the decision once it is finally made. (Imagine the – historically quite realistic - case where the 
“constitutional monarch”  a minor.) All this notwithstanding, sincerely subjecting a proposal 
to said “agent” for their consent can embody a distinctive kind of respect for said “agent”, 
however peculiar that respect may seem from the point of view of standard discussions of 
contractual agreements between “equal” and “autonomous” parties. If things were always 
otherwise, the path from knowing “how the system works” to the conclusion that the system 
is absurd would be very short indeed. And still, at least for many of us, it isn’t. Different 
systems of checks and balances can have a complex and historically conditioned rationale, 
and can be implemented in different ways consistently with the insight that their function is 
to underwrite the legitimacy of mutually significant decisions in which it matters that the 
relevant participants in some sense make them together, and where giving the participants an 
opportunity to play a part in decisions that affect them is an important way of showing 
respect for the individual agents they actually are.  
 
Of course, the political theory of “the consenting public” has often been taken to presuppose 
a conception of the individuals asked for consent as fully autonomous, or self-governing, 
rational agents (although quite a bit of dubious idealization is normally required even there. 
See e.g. Rawls 1971.) This is a condition that, by hypothesis, is not met by the consenting 
individuals in the kind of “non-ideal” case at issue in this paper. Nevertheless, my suggestion 
is that an analogous rationale can be provided for consent requirements involving people who 
fall short of exhibiting the standard marks of fully autonomous, or self-governing, rational 
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agency. On this view, the interventions the persons in question can reasonably be expected to 
be offered the opportunity for consent to are interventions (e.g. of a medical kind) that will 
primarily affect themselves, as well as those who care for, or otherwise interact with, them. 
They involve decisions that benefit from an analogous system of “checks and balances”, even 
if in certain cases the probative force of the refusal to consent only gives rise to prima facie 
obligations, or is otherwise defeasible to the point of being reasonably overridden by other 
concerns. To this extent, the process of eliciting consent can be said to have not only 
instrumental (as in avoiding patient frustration and resistance), or epistemic (as in getting all 
relevant information about the patient) value; it can also be said to have intrinsic value, in 
virtue of respecting the fact that the decisions in question are ones in which both the agents 
asking for consent and the agents being asked for it should be, in some non-trivial sense, 
meaningfully involved.11  
 
4. Consent, meaning and agency based interests 
 
What, if anything, can be said to explain or justify the claim that agents in a “non-ideal” case 
should be meaningfully involved in decisions that affect them? The present proposal is that 
having the opportunity to be meaningfully involved in decisions that principally affect us is 
something in which we have an interest, and hence that not to be given an opportunity to give 
or withhold consent to those decisions is to frustrate that interest by excluding us from the 
																																								 																				
11	 People doing things together in the sense relevant here is likely to depend on the 
establishment and maintenance of non-trivial levels of trust. The application of consent 
requirements can be one way of promoting or protecting such trust. I am grateful to an 
anonymous referee for pointing out the connection between consent and trust in this 
connection. A discussion of the nature of trust, and whether its role in consent is one that 
should be thought of as having either intrinsic or extrinsic value, would take me too far afield 
in the context of the present paper. 
	 14	
collective that normally should be involved in making them. What explains that we have this 
interest is the fact that we are agents capable of interactions of the requisite kind (e.g. 
interactions involving the eliciting of our consent with respect to what is to happen to us). 
This agency-based interest is an interest that someone can possess without themselves being 
able to effectively pursue it; protect it; defend it; or even fully articulate either it or its ethical 
rationale. Yet it is an interest that agents who fail to display the marks of fully autonomous, 
or self-governing, rational agency can share with agents who do display those marks, and 
therefore an interest that can rationalise consent requirements for agents in both categories. In 
other words, it is an interest that can ground a set of reasons to elicit consent that all the 
agents in question (autonomous or not) in some sense “share” (although not in the sense that 
some Kantians would say that there is a distinctive class of reasons that fully autonomous, or 
self-governing, rational agents all “share” by means of their capacity to autonomously, or 
otherwise rationally, grasp them). This agency-based interest therefore falls into the same 
broad category as other interests attributed to vulnerable others and that are sometimes 
appealed to in order to make sense of ethical constraints in our dealings with frail or disabled 
adults, children, or some non-human agents. 
 
There are at least two different ways in which we can understand the idea of an agency-based 
interest. On the first (and narrower) interpretation, agency-based interests exist in virtue of 
some specific exercise of agency on the part of its holder, and are in that sense “self-
generated”. Thus, it could be said that I have an interest in having have an office with enough 
space for books in virtue of once having decided to become a university academic. On the 
second (and wider) interpretation, agency-based interests exist in virtue of their holders 
having the property of being able to exercise agency (or being capable of exercising agency 
in certain ways, such as making decisions along with others). In that sense, agency-based 
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interest are not necessarily self-generated because something can be good for someone 
merely in virtue of their being able to exercise agency (or being capable of exercising agency 
in certain ways), and so independently of whether, and if so in what particular way, that 
capacity for agency is actually exercised on any occasion. Thus, it could be said that I have 
an interest in maintaining basic physical coordination even if I am currently too maimed or 
incapacitated to actually consider the issue.  
 
It is the latter (and thus wider) interpretation of agency-based interests that underpins the 
argument of this paper. The significance of this is as follows. First, it is not being assumed 
that the interests providing a rationale for consent requirements are a function of the 
particular way that someone’s agency has actually been exercised on any occasion. Thus, it is 
an interest I can in principle have even if it is one that I take no interest in, or have even 
renounced. (In the latter case, it may be natural to think that any prima facie obligations to 
which it gives rise would sometimes be overridden.) Second, it is not being assumed that the 
interests providing a rationale for consent requirements are a function of some particular way 
the individual possessing them is capable of exercising them. Thus, it is an interest I can in 
principle have even it is one that I have no effective control over myself, or that I cannot even 
understand very well (if at all). It follows that agency-based interests (thus widely 
understood) could in principle be attributed even to agents who fail to meet standard criteria 
of capacity or competence. Third, insofar as it might  - quite reasonably - be thought that 
agency-based interests are ethically more significant to the extent that their existence and 
content does depend on some particular actual exercise of agency, this could explain why 
basic capacity or competence is often thought of as a threshold above which consent 
considerations carry a distinctively important, or even decisive, ethical force. This does not, 
however, imply that such considerations carry no ethical force at all beyond the domain of 
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competence or capacity. Indeed, it is one of the main advantages of the argument of this 
paper that by appealing to the latter (and so wider) interpretation of agency-based interests we 
can make sense of the claim that they sometimes do, and why. 
 
As previously noted the agency-based interest respected by eliciting consent in a “non-ideal” 
case is an interest that can be realized consistently with its exercise being such as to issue in 
choices, actions and outcomes that are otherwise not in the agent’s interest, much less in their 
best interest, or in their interest overall (as stipulated in the definition of a “non-ideal case”). 
It follows that the argument for respecting consent in the “non-ideal” case is not the standard 
kind of argument in the literature that we should respect the choices of agents because this is 
likely to be instrumental to, or a realization of, what is in their best interest (c.f. Dworkin 
1994). On the contrary, it is an argument that preserves both the claim that in failing to elicit 
consent in a “non-ideal” case you can fail to respect someone’s interest, and the claim that in 
failing to elicit their consent can promote their best interest. The point is that in these cases 
you could be doing something prima facie wrong to that someone by acting in their best 
interest, even if they fail to exhibit the marks of fully autonomous, or self-governing, rational 
agency. If the interest you thereby fail to respect is such as to justify the imposition of prima 
facie duties on others, as might be argued on a so-called “Interest Theory” of rights, then the 
agency-based interest involved in decisions affecting oneself can in principle be thought of as 
a ground of duties on others to elicit consent, and thereby also of a right (however defeasible) 
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to be asked for and potentially refuse it.12 Be that as it may, an Interest Theory of rights, 
interpreted consistently with the wider interpretation of agency-based interests introduced 
above, can explain the existence of any prima facie rights and duties we might wish to assert 
with respect to consent requirements in a “non-ideal” case in a way that is not 
correspondingly available on accounts of rights and duties grounded in the capacity for fully 
autonomous, or self-governing, rational agency (such as standard versions of a so-called 
“Will”, or “Choice”, theory), or some theory of rights grounding their existence in agency-
based interests on the narrower interpretation introduced above. Whether this implication is 
an advantage or a disadvantage of an Interest Theory of Rights thus understood is a topic for 
another occasion.13 
 
One advantage of the proposal just outlined is that it explains the ethical significance of 
consent i “non-ideal” cases without implausibly assuming that in order for failure to get my 
consent to count as problematic I must be thought of as either having exercised my agency in 
a given way, or as be in the possession of capacities I don’t actually have. According to this 
proposal, the justification of consent requirements in these “non-ideal” cases relies partly on 
the fact that although the person from whom consent is elicited does not possess all the 
features associated with fully autonomous, or self-governing, rational agency, they do possess 
																																								 																				
12 The topic of the relation between rights and interests is complex and controversial. For a 
discussion broadly along the lines suggested in the main text, see e.g. Raz 1986. For an 
account of interests (e.g. in being able to give and receive promises; to make and break 
contracts, and potentially to give and receive consent) that I take to be consistent in principle 
with the account in the main text, see Owens 2012. Owens does not apply his account of what 
he calls “normative” interests to the range of non-ideal cases under consideration here, so it 
unclear whether he would extend their scope to cover cases where the putative holder of the 
relevant interest is effectively unable to fully understand or control its exercise. 
13	I have previously discussed this issue, but much too briefly, in Lillehammer 2012. 
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at least some of them; in particular certain features that make it possible to engage in 
meaningful activity, including some form of meaningful communication with others (he 
notion of “meaningfulness” in play does not imply that the activities in question are 
necessarily regarded as meaningful to all the persons involved at the time, nor – given their 
condition – that they could in principle be so regarded by them) The category of agents in 
question includes a wide range of persons suffering from chronic mental disabilities; 
developmental conditions; advancing dementia; anxiety disorders; addiction, and the like. For 
lack of a better label, I refer to individuals in possession of these features as having the 
capacity for meaningful agency. The present proposal is that this is a capacity that individual 
agents in a “non-ideal” case could actually have, and in terms of which any requirement to 
elicit their consent could potentially be explained or justified.14  
 
The category of “meaningful agency” at issue here is intended to include agency that satisfies 
standard definitions of “capacity” or “competence”, without  such definitions. Instead, the 
point of invoking the language of “meaningful agency” is to provide an informal conceptual 
currency  which the ethical significance of legal definitions of “capacity” or “competence” 
and the like can be ethically discussed. One of the things the appeal to meaningful agency 
may help to provide is an answer to the question why we should care about a patient’s mere 
capacity or competence (however defined) when we have every reason to believe that its 
exercise is unlikely to be in the patient’s best interest. While I do not have a comprehensive 
theory to offer about what meaningful agency would consist in across all possible contexts, 
																																								 																				
14	 While the assumption that any genuine, or ultimate, reasons to elicit consent must be 
explained in terms of features intrinsic to the agents in question is generally accepted in the 
literature on this topic, it is obviously as assumption that might be questioned (for example in 
some of the cases provided in Section 3 above). Even if we relax that assumption, however, it 
remains a virtue of the present proposal that it is in principle able to explain the reasons in 
question by appeal to intrinsic features of agents. I do not, therefore, propose to discuss this 
issue further here.  
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I’m not really sure that one is needed for present purposes. I have three reasons for making 
this claim. First, there are indisputable cases of agents falling outside the domain of fully 
autonomous, or self-governing, rational agency for whom the question of consent at issue in 
this paper clearly does arise, and I have identified a number of such cases in the text. Second, 
there are indisputable cases of entities falling outside this domain, such as my pot plants or 
stereo, with respect to which this question clearly does not arise; or at least not in the same 
way. (There is obviously going to be significant scope for vagueness here, and there is no a 
priori reason to think that any reasonable “sharpening” would be either “speciesist”, or 
restricted to organic life forms alone). Third, and with respect to the theoretical purposes at 
issue in this paper, there is no reason why a broadly circular and heuristic definition would 
not do (such as – and this is only a schematic example – “X is capable of meaningful agency 
iff some agent (be that X or someone else) can take up a “second-personal stance” with 
respect to X without irrationality, false belief, or self-deception”).15 The operational 
constraints imposed by a context where institutional norms and legal frameworks are to be 
formulated are obviously a different matter, but even here there is likely to be “traces” of 
broad circularity at work (e.g. in the interpretation of “capacity” or “competence” cited in 
Footnote 2 above). 
 
In previous work, I have distinguished between respecting someone’s agent autonomy on the 
one hand,16 and respecting their choice autonomy on the other.17 The notion of meaningful 
																																								 																				
15	 For a comprehensive discussion of the second-personal standpoint and its ethical 
significance, see e.g. Darwall 2006. Nothing in the main text should be read so as to imply 
the endorsement of Darwall’s account of that notion in his book, which, for reasons that 
should be clear from the main text, would be excessively demanding for the purposes of the 
present paper. 
16 As defined in Lillehammer (2012), agent autonomy requires possession of the following 
marks of rational self-governance: i) manifestation of a capacity for higher order reflection 
and endorsement of practical options; ii) the actual manifestation of a capacity for planning 
and executing actions that accord with the practical options endorsed; iii) responsiveness of 
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agency identified in the previous paragraph is meant to give further content to the idea, 
proposed in that work, that there is a range of agents (not necessarily a single, or unique kind) 
for whom to respect choice autonomy is an ethical default option even in the absence of agent 
autonomy. The idea, to put it in summary form, is this. There is a form of respect we can 
reasonably be said to owe to some agents who are not capable of fully autonomous, or self-
governing, rational agency in virtue of the fact that they are able to engage in communicative 
interactions that either they themselves, or those who interact with them (e.g. friends, family, 
carers, medical personnel, etc.), can reasonably think of as meaningful. This is a form of 
respect that can be owed to such agents irrespective of how their ability to engage in 
meaningful activity is related to their (non-existent, failing, or yet to be realised) capacity to 
exercise fully autonomous, or self-governing, rational agency; although the case for 
respecting their meaningful activity could obviously be enhanced (and radically so) by its 
relationship to some (possibly non-actualized) capacity to exercise fully autonomous, or self-
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reflection, endorsement and execution of options to minimally intelligible standards of 
rational argument; and iv) reflection, endorsement and execution of practical options that 
involve a conception of oneself as a single person living a certain kind of life. 
17 As defined in Lillehammer (2012), choice autonomy requires at least being presented with 
a non-empty set of (in the relevant circumstances) reasonable options between which one is 
able to choose, or otherwise express a preference. (C.f. the UK definition of “capacity” in 
Footnote 2 above.) 
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